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Abstract
The observed cooperation on the level of genes, cells, tissues, and individuals has been the object of intense study by
evolutionary biologists, mainly because cooperation often flourishes in biological systems in apparent contradiction to the
selfish goal of survival inherent in Darwinian evolution. In order to resolve this paradox, evolutionary game theory has
focused on the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD), which incorporates the essence of this conflict. Here, we encode strategies for the
iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) in terms of conditional probabilities that represent the response of decision pathways
given previous plays. We find that if these stochastic strategies are encoded as genes that undergo Darwinian evolution, the
environmental conditions that the strategies are adapting to determine the fixed point of the evolutionary trajectory, which
could be either cooperation or defection. A transition between cooperative and defective attractors occurs as a function of
different parameters such as mutation rate, replacement rate, and memory, all of which affect a player’s ability to predict an
opponent’s behavior. These results imply that in populations of players that can use previous decisions to plan future ones,
cooperation depends critically on whether the players can rely on facing the same strategies that they have adapted to.
Defection, on the other hand, is the optimal adaptive response in environments that change so quickly that the information
gathered from previous plays cannot usefully be integrated for a response.
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Introduction
The evolution of cooperation is difficult to understand within
Darwinian theory [1–3]. Indeed, cooperation is intrinsically
vulnerable to exploitation because evolution rewards individual
success, while any detrimental long-term effects for the group are
secondary [4,5]. The tension between the short-term benefits of
defection and the long-term benefits of cooperation has been
studied using the Prisoner’s Dilemma as a paradigm of social
conflicts [3,6–9]. Previous work has shown that cooperation can
only emerge in the presence of different enabling mechanisms.
The main ones are direct reciprocity [6,10] (which can emerge
when players play against each other repeatedly), spatial
reciprocity [7], which is ensured if players only play neighbors
on a regular grid (or more generally, on arbitrary graphs, giving
rise to ‘‘network reciprocity’’ [11]), tag-based selection [12] (where
players can recognize each other using some observable trait), kin
selection [13], indirect reciprocity [14,15] (where cooperative or
altruistic acts increase a player’s reputation), or group selection
[16]. Social diversity, where either the payoffs or the neighbor-
hoods vary from player to player [17,18] can also enhance
cooperation, as can ‘‘active linking’’ [19,20], where players differ
in the rate at which they maintain interactions with other players.
Generally speaking, the co-evolution of strategies with the different
enabling mechanisms can also increase cooperation [21]. In all the
discussed scenarios, a player’s strategy is such that they either
cooperate or defect in a deterministic manner, sometimes
conditionally on previous plays.
If a cooperating strategy accidentally defects (or a defector
accidentally cooperates) the noise that is introduced in this manner
can have a dramatic effect on the competition. For example,
among the (deterministic) strategies that take one previous move
into account in order to decide how to play, the reciprocating
strategy ‘‘TFT’’ (Tit-for-Tat) dominates [6], but is outcompeted
[22–24] by ‘‘Win-Stay-Lose-Shift’’ (WSLS), which can correct for
occasional mistakes [23]. Experiments with bacteria [25] and
social amoeba [26] indeed suggest that the decision to cooperate
or defect (in a general sense) is stochastic, and moreover that these
decisions are controlled by genetically-encoded probabilities that
are evolvable [27]. Rather than assuming that noisy decisions are
either due to fuzziness in perception or lack of control over one’s
action [22], here we allow these probabilities to be fine-tuned by
adaptation in response to the environment. We find that if a
player’s stochastic decisions are under genetic control, then the
level of uncertainty about an opponent’s next move (given their
previous encounter) determines whether cooperation or defection
evolves. Because this uncertainty is a direct consequence of
environmental conditions, we conclude that when decisions are
based on previous interactions, these conditions alone are
sufficient to explain the evolution of cooperation in populations.
Note that the stochasticity introduced by probabilistic play
controlled by genes is fundamentally different from other random
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such as a probability to inherit a neighbor’s strategy [28], or
stochastically fluctuating payoffs [29,30], because neither of them
can evolve.
In its simplest form, PD players have only two play options:
cooperate (C) or defect (D). Both players are awarded a payoff R
for mutual cooperation and a payoff P for mutual defection.
Unequal moves award S to the cooperator and T to the defector.
In standard PD [6], the values of the payoffs are constrained so
that T.R.P.S and R.(S+T)/2. The first equation ensures that
for a single round of play, defection is an evolutionary stable
strategy [4], while the second equation ensures that reciprocation
of cooperation is favored over the trading of cooperative with
defective moves. In the repeated PD (iterated PD or IPD) that we
study here, two players meet more than once, and can establish
cooperation by means of direct reciprocity [6]. In particular, we
study exclusively the IPD with memory, that is, where players base
their decision on previous plays (except for the first move with a
new opponent). The term ‘‘memory’’ is not meant to imply that
only higher organisms can engage in such strategies. Rather,
stochastic decisions can be based entirely on the levels of protein
on a cell’s receptor, for example, and where these protein levels are
the result of a cellular ‘‘decision’’ at an earlier time. A simple
example for such a stochastic decision in response to the decision
of other cells is quorum sensing in bacteria (see, e.g., [31]). We
contend that the introduction of information exchange between
players (via conditional strategies) is crucial for the evolution of
cooperation.
Results
We evolve strategies in spatially-structured and well-mixed finite
populations, as it is known that the evolutionary dynamics depend
on population structure as well as size (small fitness differences are
effectively neutral only in finite populations [32]). Evolution
experiments are carried out with populations on a regular 32632
grid with wrapping boundary conditions, where the manner of
replacement determines the population structure. Players engage
their eight closest neighbors exactly once every update (playing
one move), for 500,000 iterations. At the end of each update, a
proportion r (the replacement rate) of players is randomly
eliminated using a Moran-like process [33,34], establishing a
finite probability of future encounters between players beyond the
first [35]. For spatially-structured populations, each player marked
for death is replaced by an offspring of one of his neighbors, while
for well-mixed populations the entire grid of players is considered
for filling the empty position. In both population types, replicating
players are chosen in proportion to their fitness, defined as the
accumulated score. Scores are awarded according to the standard
payoff matrix of Axelrod [35] throughout, with T=5, R=3,
P=1, S=0.
For memory-one strategies, each player is represented by a
genotype (strategy) composed of five genes, four of which encode
the conditional probabilities PXY representing the probability that
a player will cooperate, given that his last historical play was X and
his opponent’s response was Y, along with the unconditional
probability PC to cooperate on the first move [24]. Each
population is seeded with the ‘‘random’’ genotype where each of
the five probabilities is set to 0.5. At each replication event, genes
are subject to a per-gene mutation rate m, replacing that gene’s
probability to cooperate with a uniformly distributed number
between 0 and 1.
For each evolutionary run, we record the genotype as well as
phenotype (play statistics pCC, pCD, pDC, and pDD, given by the
fraction of that type of play among all plays) for each organism on
the line of descent (LOD) [36]. The LOD is generated by
randomly selecting a genotype at the end of each run and tracing
back its ancestry to the seeding genotype. Compared to the
previously discovered deterministic memory-one strategies [37],
our genetic implementation leads to the evolution of novel and
drastically different successful strategies, depending on mutation
rate, replacement rate, and population structure. None of the 32
deterministic strategies ever appear on the LOD, but instead,
strategies evolve that are either cooperative or defective,
depending on the experimental setting. Using the LOD averaged
over 80 runs (see Fig. S1), we can obtain a consensus genotype for
the particular experiment by averaging all genotypes in the latter
half of this average LOD, removing any influence from the
starting conditions (see Methods).
The consensus genotype for spatially-structured populations at
low mutation and replacement rates is that of a cooperative
strategy (PC, PCC, PCD, PDC, PDD=0.647, 0.989, 0.234, 0.318,
0.448), as is evident from a commitment to exchange C plays (i.e.,
PCC<1) and a tendency to cooperate on the first move. By having
a low PCD probability this strategy maintains a low tolerance to
opponent defection and displays an unwillingness to be exploited.
Maintaining a PDD value close to 0.5 with a slight bias towards
defection, the consensus genotype expresses indifference in
propagating defection but willingness to return to cooperation, a
behavior not previously seen among stochastic strategies [24].
When faced with defective play, the strategy will acquire a deficit
in lifetime payoff, which can be offset by exploiting naı ¨ve
cooperators (and occasionally similar strategies) as indicated by a
low PDC probability. Consensus strategies for cooperation in well-
mixed populations, as well as defectors in both population
structures (that appear at high mutation and replacement rates)
are listed in Table S1 and described in Text S1.
In order to monitor the evolution of strategies, we reduce
strategy space by performing a principal component analysis
(PCA) of the probabilities on the average LOD obtained from 80
runs at mutation rate m=0.5% and replacement rate r=1%, and
use these components to display the average trajectory at other
mutation rates as well. For the spatially-structured population the
first two principal components explain 83% and 10% of the
variance, respectively (see Methods). Within the two-dimensional
window defined by these principal components, we can also mark
Author Summary
The observed cooperation between genes, cells, tissues,
and higher organisms represents a paradox for Darwinian
evolution, because the individual success of cheating is
rewarded before its long-term detrimental consequences
are felt. The tension between cooperation and defection
can be represented by a simple game (the ‘‘Prisoner’s
Dilemma’’), which has been used to study the conflicts
between decisions to cooperate or defect. Here, we
encode these decisions within genes, and allow them to
adapt to environments that differ in how well a player can
predict how an opponent is going to play. We find that
evolutionary paths end at strategies that cooperate if the
environment is sufficiently predictable, while they end in
defection in uncertain and inconsistent worlds because
inconsistency favors defection over cooperation. This work
shows that cooperation or defection, in populations of
players that use the information from previous moves to
plan future ones, can be influenced by changing the
environmental parameters.
Evolution of Stochastic Strategies
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evolutionary trajectories obtained from the average LOD move
towards a fixed point defined by a consensus genotype (see
Methods) that represents the dominant strategy in the particular
regime, while the actual genotypes on the LOD form a cloud in
strategy space around the consensus that defines the strategy
attractor. Strategies form clouds around this attractor because in a
genetic implementation of IPD, the selective pressures acting on
genes depend on the population a player finds himself in. For
example, the DD gene in a cooperating population will begin to
drift, only to return to its adaptive value when an invasion of
defectors reinstates the selective pressure. Similarly, the CD and
DC genes are under weakened selection in spatial populations
because they are only expressed at the boundaries of homogeneous
clusters.
The path in strategy space along the average LOD depends
strongly on the mutation rate, and shows a qualitative switch—
reminiscent of a phase transition—from the cooperative attractor
RC (Fig. 1A) to the defecting attractor RD (Fig. 1C) at a critical
value (Fig. 1B), as the mutation rate is increased. Studying the
trajectories that emanate from the 16 (ignoring the first gene)
deterministic strategies (Fig. 1D) suggests that the evolutionary
fixed points are unique attractors for a given environment. We
characterize the attractors with an order parameter m generated from
the average play frequencies:
m~
SpCCT{SpDDT
SpCCTzSpDDT
, ð1Þ
which is the normalized difference between frequencies of
cooperative and defective play, averaged over the genotypes on
the LOD after equilibration (see Methods). This parameter crosses
zero at a critical mutation rate (Fig. 2A), indicating a transition
from cooperative to defective strategies. We find that a transition
Figure 1. Evolutionary trajectories and attractors. All trajectories start at the same point (START), and move towards the strategy marked by
‘END’. Several well-known strategies provide landmarks in strategy space: TFT: (PCC, PCD, PDC, PDD)=(1,0,1,0), ALLC=(1,1,1,1), ALLD=(0,0,0,0),
WSLS=(1,0,0,1), GTFT=(1,0.333,1,0), START=(0.5,0.5,0.5,0.5). All experiments shown are run in a spatially-structured environment at replacement rate
r=1%. Trajectories for well-mixed populations are shown in Fig. S3. (A) Evolution of the average LOD for m=0.5%. RC marks the consensus genotype
(see Methods) of this trajectory, while RAND marks the consensus genotype at m=50%, when the population drifts neutrally. This attractor is not the
same as ‘END’ because that genotype lies past the most recent common ancestor of the population. (B) Trajectory for m=2.5%, close to the critical
mutation rate. (C) Trajectory for m=5%. ‘RD’ marks the consensus genotype for these parameters. (D) Trajectories emanating from 16 deterministic
strategies (at m=0.5%) suggest that the fixed point is unique. Blue symbols: start, red dots: end points. Symbols: X: TFT, &: ALLC, w: ALLD, m: WSLS.
A–D use principal components of trajectory shown in A.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000948.g001
Evolution of Stochastic Strategies
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other parameters discussed below.
We can study the evolution of cooperation by plotting the order
parameter Eq. [1] as a function of r and m in a phase diagram that
shows that both low replacement rate and low mutation rate lead
to cooperation (Fig. 2B), but that the cooperative phase is much
smaller for well-mixed populations (Fig. 2C). As m approaches 0.5
(a per-genome mutation rate of 2.5 mutations per replication
event), both the spatially-structured and the well-mixed popula-
tions begin to drift randomly, signaling that selection has become
incapable of maintaining the genetic information. This transition is
likely a quasispecies delocalization [38], but is smooth rather than
abrupt owing to the small genome size [39]. That all strategies
occur with equal frequencies in the population when taking the
limit of very high mutation rate has been noted before [40].
Previous studies have only investigated small slices of this phase
diagram by varying the average number of rounds between players
[6] (for deterministic strategies) or varying the mutation rate in
analytic calculations and numeric simulations of an infinitely
iterated Markov process [11,40], concluding that cooperation is
favored in spatially-structured population but not in well-mixed
ones [41]. The phase diagram suggests instead that both
cooperation and defection are possible in either population
structure, but that the parameter range that facilitates cooperation
in well-mixed populations is more restricted.
As the order parameter Eq. [1] is obtained from play statistics
that represent the phenotype of players, we may ask how this
transition is reflected in the genotype instead. The consensus
genotype shows a marked decrease of the PCC probability as
mutation rate increases, with clear differences between strategies
in spatial (Fig. 3A) versus well-mixed (Fig. 3B) scenarios, as has
been noted before [24]. At the critical mutation rate (Fig. 3,
dashed vertical lines), the probability to cooperate after CC equals
the probability to defect after DD. Thus, the consensus genotypes
mirror the play statistics obtained to define the critical point.
Discussion
Cooperation is inherently more risky than defection because it
forgoes a guaranteed return (P) with the expectation of a benefit
(R), rather than keeping the guaranteed return hoping for a
windfall (T). This risk is mitigated if the uncertainty about
receiving the benefit is reduced. For example, spatial reciprocity
allows kin strategies to preferentially play each other (because kin
place offspring close to themselves) thus increasing trust. In our
model, an increase in mutation rate decreases the probability that
Figure 2. Transitions in strategy space. (A) The order parameter m defined in Eq. [1] as a function of the mutation rate for a spatially-structured
and a well-mixed population, obtained from play statistics averaged over 80 independent runs each (see Text S2). Errors are two standard errors. (B)
Qualitative phase diagram as a function of m and r for spatially-structured populations, where light grey indicates cooperation and black indicates
defection. (C) Phase diagram for well-mixed populations. Both phase diagrams with quantitative levels of cooperation are shown in Fig. S4.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000948.g002
Figure 3. Evolution of consensus genotypes. Mean of probabilities of the consensus genotype as a function of mutation rate (r=1%). Colored
areas represent the variance of the probability distribution, and reflect the strength of selection. (PC is omitted because it drifts neutrally, see
Methods). Vertical lines drawn at the critical mutation rate. (A) Spatially-structured. (B) Well-mixed.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000948.g003
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of kin), and thus increases the uncertainty about the identity of the
strategy a player will face. An increased replacement rate has a
similar effect, as increasing r shortens the average number of plays
that a pair engages in, and this again decreases the probability to
face a kin strategy (mutated or not). Previously, a general theory
for the evolution of cooperation has been proposed [42,43] that
posits that positive assortment between a player’s genotype and the
opponent’s phenotype is sufficient to promote cooperation, using
arguments that ultimately recapitulate Queller’s [44] extension of
Hamilton’s rule.
In our experiments with stochastic conditional strategies, the
assortment between a player’s genotype and an opponent’s
phenotype is generated via the evolution of conditional interactions
between the players [45], i.e., their ability to base their decisions on
information about past behavior. In a sense, evolutionary
adaptation creates this assortment by forging a ‘‘model’’ of the
environment (in terms of the probabilities PXY) that is adapted to the
phenotype given by the play frequencies pXY. For example, the
cooperative fixed point represents a strategy that cooperates with
cooperators, retaliates against defectors, but also forgives mistakes.
Thus, it models an environment where cooperators dominate,
errors happen, and sometimes defectors try to invade.
More uncertain environments reduce the accuracy of the model,
thereby reducing positive assortment, leading to reduced cooper-
ation. Can changing environmental conditions then drive a
population from a cooperating to a defecting phenotype and vice
versa? In Fig. 4, we show the order parameter of an adapting
population on the line of descent where we changed the mutation
rate abruptly from one favoring defection to one favoring
cooperation, and back. We see that the population responds quickly
(in terms of evolutionary time) and predictably to the changes.
If consistent environments enable cooperative behavior of
strategies that rely on ‘‘sensing’’ their environment, we should
also be able to influence the critical mutation rate (where
cooperation turns into defection) by changing other parameters
that affect uncertainty. For example, it is possible to increase
player memory so that the last two moves by both players are taken
into account to make decisions about cooperation or defection. In
this case, player strategies are encoded in 21 genes, which can be
used to predict future moves. As expected, the critical mutation
rate is pushed to higher genomic mutation rates mL (where L is the
number of genes) for memory 2 (Fig. 5A), and even higher for
memory 3 (data not shown). Another source of unpredictability is
the maximal strategy uncertainty given by the Shannon entropy
[46] of the genome. In the present implementation, the
probabilities that affect player decisions are coarse-grained to a
resolution of 32,768 different alleles for each probability, or 15 bits
of entropy per gene. Decreasing this resolution decreases the
uncertainty generated by mutations. Fig. 5B shows the depen-
dence of the order parameter on mutation rate for coarse-
grainings of strategy space down to 1 bit (the deterministic
strategies). In this limit, the critical mutation rate (for 1%
replacement) is pushed towards m=10%, implying that higher
mutation rates result in defective play even though cooperation is
expected [7,47]. Thus, obtaining more information about the
environment, for example by basing decisions on more than one
past move, increases the amount of information that a player can
use to model the environment, and therefore gives rise to a more
close assortment between genotype and opponent phenotype,
which increases cooperation.
A framework where evolutionary game theory is implemented
via genes that are under mutation and selection could also be used
to predict how manipulation of the environment will affect the
evolutionary fixed point in other systems. For example, defection
has been observed in a number of biological systems whose
dynamics can be described by a PD payoff matrix [48,49]. It is
tempting to imagine that these systems can be coaxed into
cooperation if mutation rate or turnover rate can be manipulated
(as is shown in Fig. 4).
Evolution can be viewed as a process in which organisms
increase their fit to the world by acquiring information about their
environment [36,50]. Via this process, genomes become correlated
to their environment, that is, genotypes that are adapted to their
niche covary with the niche’s character. Clearly, such a covariance
is greatly enhanced if organisms can sense their environment, and
thus base their decisions appropriately on the context. Therefore,
we can expect that the evolution of sensory circuits that inform
Figure 4. Strategy evolution under changing mutation rates. Order parameter m as a function of update time for an experiment with five
changes in mutation rate, starting with a type adapted to a high mutation rate of 5% (defection regime). We show the order parameter for the
average LOD of 80 runs with the same regime of mutation rate changes. The population reacts to a changed mutation rate quickly, and settles
around the fixed point appropriate for that mutation rate, indicated in the figure.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000948.g004
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covariance so that cooperation is expected according to Queller’s
rule [44] (unless environments are so inherently uncertain that they
must remain uninformative to any player). If this is indeed true,
then it appears that cooperation does not need to be added as a
‘‘third fundamental principle of evolution beside mutation and
natural selection’’ as was suggested before [9], because it is a
consequence of evolution.
Methods
Population dynamics
The payoff for different moves was kept constant at Axelrod’s
values for all simulations:
RS
TP

~
30
51

:
At each update, every player on the 32632 grid (with wrapping
boundary conditions) plays each of its neighbors exactly once.
Upon birth, each player begins by consulting its PC gene for each
opponent, and one of the four conditional genes thereafter,
depending on its own play and the opponent’s response. Players
are selected for removal randomly with a probability given by the
replacement rate r, giving rise to overlapping generations
(asynchronous updating) [51,52]. As long as the player and its
opponent are not replaced, they continue to consult their
conditional genes to make decisions, so the replacement rate
determines the average length of play history between two players
(if a player’s partner is replaced, the partner is greeted by
consulting the unconditional gene). For most replacement rates,
the first gene is consulted so rarely that it drifts neutrally, with a
mean around 0.5 and a variance of 1/12, as expected for a
uniformly distributed random variable bounded by zero and one.
As a consequence, we often do not show any statistics for this gene.
To implement well-mixed populations using our grid structure,
we only changed the identity of the pool used for replacing
individuals marked for death, thus keeping the rest of the dynamics
consistent. For structured populations, the eight neighbors of the
marked individual are candidates for replication, with a probability
proportional to their fitness given by their lifetime accumulated
score. For well-mixed populations, the pool is given by all 1,023
remaining strategies in the population (in a Moran process, it is not
usual for the individual to be marked for death to be included in the
candidates for replication), but each strategy still plays eight
neighbors. The player to be replaced, on the other hand, is chosen
randomly among all 1,024 players in the population, irrespective of
population structure or fitness. After replication, a genotype is
mutated with a probability m, which is the mean number of
mutations per gene per individual, implemented as a Poisson
process. For most of the results in this study, the gene’s probabilities
are coarse-grained to 15 bits, which means that the probabilities are
chosen from among 2
15=32,768 possible values, representing the
number of possible alleles at that locus. This resolution affects the
critical mutation rates as shown in Fig. 5B, but increasing the
resolution past 15 bits does not (data not shown). Because the
mutation probabilitiesarethoughtto represent thedecisionofentire
pathways of perhaps hundreds of genes, they should not be
compared to per-nucleotide mutation rates.
Line of descent and consensus genotypes
Rather than collecting population averages of plays, we instead
study the evolution of strategies by following the line of descent
(LOD) of player genotypes for each replicate run. The LOD is
obtained by choosing a random player at the end of the run and
following its direct ancestors backwards to the first genotype [36].
Fig. S2A shows a typical sequence of genotypes, while Fig. S2B
shows the play statistics for the same LOD. The population
average of play statistics for the same experiment is shown for
comparison in Fig. S2C. Average lines of descent and average play
statistics along the line of descent can be created by averaging, for
each update, the probabilities of the genotypes as well as the
probabilities of play, of the organism on the LOD of each of the 80
replicates at that update. Fig. S1A shows such an average genetic
Figure 5. Order parameter in different environments for spatially-structured populations. (A) Phase transition for populations playing
with memories of different size as a function of genomic mutation rate mL, where L=5 for memory-one strategies (D1, blue line) and L=21 for
memory-two strategies (D2, pink line). (B) Phase transition for environments with different resolutions of strategy space, from 15 bits per gene to 1
bit per gene (deterministic strategies). Colors as in legend.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000948.g005
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the line of descent for two different mutation rates. The latter two
figures show that the average play statistics converge towards
evolutionary fixed points that we term the consensus genotype, but
that the time to achieve this fixed point depends on the mutation
rate. The consensus genotype for each set of replicates is obtained
by averaging the second half of the average genetic LOD minus
the last 50,000 updates, which removes most or all of the transient
and also the variance due to picking random genotypes as the
originators of the LOD. Indeed, because the LOD splits at the
most recent common ancestor (MRCA) of the population at the
end of the run, the LOD past the MRCA is not necessarily
representative of the evolutionary dynamics (as seen for example in
Fig. S1B.) Discarding the last 50,000 updates truncates the LOD
to genotypes before the MRCA for almost all runs. Using the
MRCA genotype instead of the consensus genotype as represen-
tative of the fixed point does not change the results.
Principal component analysis
We create the evolutionary trajectories in Fig. 1 and Fig. S3 by
performing a principal component analysis of the set of
probabilities (PCC, PCD, PDC, PDD) from all of the 500,000 data
points on the average genetic LOD of the 80 replicates at mutation
rate m=0.5% and replacement rate r=1%, for both the spatially-
structured and the well-mixed population, respectively. Because
the first gene (PC) is consulted so rarely it drifts almost neutrally
and is for that reason omitted from the PCA. Including it does not
significantly affect the four other principal components (data not
shown). For the spatially structured population we obtain
PC1=(20.86, 0.192, 20.055, 20.47) and PC2=(20.348, 0.442,
20.065, 0.824). These components explain 83% and 10% of the
variance respectively. For the well-mixed population, the principal
components are PC1=(20.714, 0.132, 20.162, 20.668) and
PC2=(20.393, 0.54, 0.646, 0.37), explaining 86% and 7% of the
variance, respectively. To depict the evolutionary trajectories at
higher mutation rate (panels B and C in Fig. 1 and panels B–D in
Fig. S3), we keep the principal components obtained with the low
mutation rate strategies so that the landmarks given by the
common deterministic strategies such as TFT (Tit-for-Tat), WSLS
(Win-Stay-Lose-Shift), ALL-C, and ALL-D remain at the same
positions. These fixed components are also used to plot the
location of the consensus genotype at mutation rate 0.5% (RC, the
‘‘robust cooperator’’), and the consensus genotype at mutation rate
5% (RD, the ‘‘robust defector’’). The consensus strategies RC and
RD for spatially-structured and well-mixed populations are
different, and described in the supplementary text below. Using
the principal components implied by the average LOD obtained at
5% mutation rate (defecting attractor) instead does not change the
nature of the results (data not shown).
Supporting Information
Figure S1 Average gene probabilities and play statistics. LOD
gene probabilities (PXY) and play statistics (pXY) for a spatially-
structured population, averaged over 80 experiments (500,000
updates each), at different m and fixed r (1%). PC and pC are
omitted because PC drifts almost neutrally (see Methods). (A)
Average gene probabilities recorded at m=1%. (B) Play statistics
recorded at m=0.1%. (C) Play statistics recorded at m=2%.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000948.s001 (0.25 MB TIF)
Figure S2 LOD and population genotypes and phenotypes.
Single run LOD gene probabilities (PXY) and play statistics (pXY), as
well as population average play statistics, for a spatially-structured
population at m=1% and r=1%. PC and pC are omitted because
PC drifts neutrally (see Methods). (A) LOD gene probabilities. (B)
LOD play statistics. (C) Average population play statistics.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000948.s002 (0.41 MB TIF)
Figure S3 Evolutionary trajectories and attractors for well-
mixed populations. All trajectories start at the same point
(‘START’), and move towards the strategy marked by ‘END’.
Several well-known strategies provide landmarks in strategy space:
‘TFT’: (PCC, PCD, PDC, PDD)=(1,0,1,0), ‘ALLC’=(1,1,1,1),
‘ALLD’=(0,0,0,0), WSLS=(1,0,0,1), GTFT=(1,0.333,1,0),
START=(0.5,0.5,0.5). All experiments shown are run at
replacement rate r=1% for well-mixed populations. (A), Evolution
of the average LOD for m=0.5%. RC marks the consensus
genotype of this trajectory (described in supplementary text S1).
This attractor is not the same as ‘END’ because that genotype lies
past the most recent common ancestor of the population. (B)
Trajectory for m=1.5%, close to the critical mutation rate. (C)
Trajectory for m=5%. ‘RD’ marks the consensus genotype for
these parameters. (D) Trajectory for m=50%. ‘RAND’ marks the
consensus genotype for these parameters.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000948.s003 (0.14 MB TIF)
Figure S4 Quantitative phase transition diagrams as a function
of m and r. Coloring is applied according to the order parameter
(m) with dark red to black indicating defection (m,20.2), light
yellow to light orange indicating cooperation (m.0.2) and orange
indicating a transition regime of equal cooperation and defection
(0.2$m$20.2). White colored areas contain no recorded data. (A)
Spatially-structured environment. (B) Well-mixed environment.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000948.s004 (0.46 MB TIF)
Table S1 Consensus genotypes for different mutation rates and
population structures. Mean probabilities for each gene averaged
over 80 average LODs, with variance in brackets. SS: spatially-
structured population, WM: well-mixed population, COOP:
cooperator, DEFEC: defector.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000948.s005 (0.04 MB
DOC)
Text S1 Description of consensus strategies.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000948.s006 (0.03 MB
DOC)
Text S2 Experimental statistics.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000948.s007 (0.03 MB
DOC)
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